tipitakafandomcom-20200215-history
AB-KV-Ch22
Tipitaka >> Abhidhamma Pitaka >> Kathavatthu >> ‘’’Kathavatthu Ch22’’’ Pali Versions : Pali English Version and Pali Devanagri Version =Kathavatthu Chapter22= 35S Final Passing Away XXII. 2. BOOK XXII 1. Of the Completion of Life. Controverted Point. — That life may be completed without a certain Tetter-quantity having been cast off. From the Commentary . — Inasmuch as the Arahant completes existence without casting off every Fetter with respect to the range of omniscience, some, like the Andhakas, hold the aforesaid view, similar to what has been noticed above (theory of the Mahasanghikas, XXL 3). The dialogue resembles XXI. 3, verbatim. 2. Of Moral Consciousness. Controverted Point . — That the Arahant is ethically con- scious when completing existence at final death. From the Commentary . — Some, like the Andhakas, hold this view on the ground that the Arahant is ever lucidly conscious, even at the hour of utterly passing away. The criticism points out that moral (ethical or good) consciousness inevitably involves meritorious karma effect hereafter. The doctrine quoted by the opponent is inconclusive. It merely points to the Arahant’s lucidity and aware- ness while dying, to his ethically neutral and therefore inoperative presence of mind and reflection at the last moments of his cognitive process a v a n a. But it was not intended to show the arising of morally good thoughts. 1 Th. — You are implying that an Arahant is achieving karma of merit, or karma of imperturbable character; 1 that 1 Or ‘for remaining static,’ anenj ab his an k h ar ap. See the same line of argument in XVII. 1. The alternatives refer to the sensuous and to the immaterial planes of existence. 613. Final Passing Away 359 he is working karma affecting destiny, and rebirth, con- ducive to worldly authority and influence, to wealth and reputation, 1 to beauty celestial or human. . . . You are implying that the Arahant, when he is pass- ing away, is accumulating or pulling down, is eliminating or grasping, is scattering or binding, is dispersing or collect- ing. 2 Is it not true of him that he stands, as Arahant, neither heaping up nor pulling down, as one who has pulled down? That he stands, as Arahant, neither putting off nor grasping at, as one who has put off? As neither scattering nor binding, as one who has scattered? As neither dispersing nor collecting, as one who has dispersed ? [3 A . — But does not an Arahant pass utterly away with lucid presence of mind, mindful and aware ? You agree. Then is this not £ good ’ consciousness ? 3 3. Of Imperturbable ( Fourth Jlicma) Consciousness. Controverted Point— That the Arahant completes ex- istence in imperturbable absorption (anehj e). From the Commentary . — Certain of the Uttar apathakas hold that the Arahant, no less than a Buddha, when passing utterly away, is in a sustained Fourth Jhana 4 the Immaterial plane. 1 Th. — But does he not complete existence with ordinary (or normal) consciousness? 5 You agree. How; then do you reconcile this with your proposition? 1 Literally, great following or retinue. 2 Cf. I. 2, § 63. 3 On the technical meaning of ‘kusala, a - lens ala ! (good, had), see above, p. 339, ‘From the Commentary.’ ‘Good’ meant ‘pro- ducing happy result.’ Now the Arahant had done with all that. 4 Wherein all thinking and feeling have been superseded by clear-' ness of mind and indifference. See p. 190, n. 2 ; Dialogues, i. 86 f. 6 Pakati-ciite — i.e., sub-consciousness (unimpressed conscious- ness, bhavangacitta). All sentient beings are normally in tills mental state. When that ends, they expire with the (so-called act of) ‘decease-consciousness which takes effect, in itself ceasing, as reborn consciousness in a new embryo. The Arahant’s 360 Of Inherited Intellect XXII. 4. 2 You are implying that he passes away with an ethically inoperative consciousness. 1 Is it not rather with a consciousness that is pure ‘ result ’? 3 Whereas accord- ing to you he passes away with a consciousness that is unmoral and purely inoperative, I suggest that it is with a consciousness that is unmoral and purely resultant. 4 And did not the Exalted One emerge from Fourth Jhana before he passed utterly away immediately after? 2 4. Of Penetrating the Truth. Controverted Point. — That an embryo is capable of pene- trating the truth. Front the Commentary. — Some— that is, certain of the Uttara- pathakas — hold that one who in his previous birth was a Stream- winner, and remains so, must have a newly resultant consciousness grasped the Truth while an embryo. 3 1 Th. — You are implying that an embryo can be instructed in, hear, and become familiar with the Doctrine, can be catechized, can take on himself the precepts, be normal mind when on the Arupa plane would be imperturbable. But the question is asked with reference to the life-plane of all five aggregates’ (not of four immaterial ones only). — Corny. 1 Kiriyamaye citte. Buddhism regards consciousness, under the specific aspect of causality, as either (1) karmic — i.e,, able to function causally as karma ; (2) resultant (v i p a k a), or due to karma ; (B) non-causal (kir iy a), called here ‘ inoperative.’ Cf. Compendium , p. 19 f. I.e., certain resultant kinds of consciousness, effects of karma in a previous birth, can never be causal again so as to effect another result in any moral order in the sense in which effects may become causes in the physical order. Again, there are certain ethically neutral states of consciousness consisting in mere action of mind without entailing moral consequences. The Buddhist idea is that the normal flux of consciousness from birth to death, in each span of life, is purely resultant, save where it is interrupted by causal, or by ‘ inoperative ’ thought. 2 Dialogues, ii. 175. 3 The UttarSpathakas were perhaps ‘ feelhig out’ for a theory of heredity. Pre-Natal and Dream-Attainment 361 guarded as to the gates of sense, abstemious in diet, devoted to vigils early and late. Is not the opposite true ? 2 Are there not two conditions for the genesis of right views — £ another’s voice and intelligent attention?’ 1 3 And can there be penetration of the Truth by one who is asleep, or languid, or blurred in intelligence, or unreflective ? 5. Three Other Arguments : ( a ) On Attainment of A rahant- ship by the Embryo; (6) on Penetration of Truth by a Dreamer; ( c ) on Attainment of Arahantship by a Dreamer. From the Commentary.— The attainment of Arab ant ship by very young Stream-winners, the story of the phenomenal seven- vear-old son of the lay-believer Suppavasa, 2 led the same sectaries to believe in even ante-natal attainment of Arahantship. 3 They, hold further, seeing the wonderful feats, such as levitation, etc., that are experienced in dreams, that the dreamer may not only penetrate the Truth, but also attain Arahantship. In all three cases the argument is simply a restatement of XXII. 4, § 3. 6. Of the Unmoral. Controverted Point . — That all drearu-consciousness is ethically neutral. From the Commentary. — From the Word, 1 There is volition , and that volition is negligible ’ 4 some — that is, certain of the Uttara ■ pathakas — hold the aforesaid view. But this was spoken with refer- 1 Anguttara-Nik., i. 87. 2 This was a favourite legend. See Pss. of the Brethren, lxx. ‘ Sivali, 3 the child-saint in question ; Jdtaka, No. 100 ; Uddna , ii. 8 ; Dhamma- pada Commentary, iv. 192 f. Also on the mother, Anguttara-Nik., ii. 62. 3 The embryonic consciousness carrying the force of previous, culminating karma into effect. See previous page, n. 1. * Vimaya, iii. 112, commenting on Vinaya Texts, ii. 226. Abbo- hari-ka (or -ya), i.e., a-voharika, not of legal or conventional status. 362 Habitual Repetition XXII. 7. ence to ecclesiastical offences. 1 Although a dreamer may entertain evil thoughts of murder, etc., no injury to life or property is wrought. Hence they cannot be classed as offences. Hence dream-thoughts are a negligible quantity, and for this reason, and not because they are ethically neutral, they may be ignored. 2 1 Th . — You admit, do you not, that a dreamer may (in dreams) commit murder, theft, etc. ? How then can you call such consciousness ethically neutral ? 2 U . — If I am wrong, was it not said by the Exalted One that dream-consciousness was negligible? If so, my proposition bolds good. 7. Of Correlation by Repetitions Controverted Point. — That there is no correlation by way of repetition. From the Commentary. — Inasmuch as all phenomena are momen- tary, nothing persisting more than an instant, nothing can be so correlated as to effect repetition ; hence there never is repetition. This is also an opinion of the Uttarapathakas. I Th. — But was it not said by the Exalted One : ‘ The. taking of life, bhikkhus, when habitually practised and 'multi- plied, is conducive to rebirth in purgatory, or among animals, or Petas. In its slightest form it results in, and is conducive to, a brief life among men’? 2 And again: 'Theft, bhikkhus, adultery , lying, slander, uttering harsh words, idle talk, intoxication, habitually practised and multiplied, arc each and all conducive to rebirth in purgatory, among animals, or Petas. The slightest theft results in, conduces to destruc- tion of property ; the mildest offence against chastity gives rise to retaliatory measures among men ; the lightest form of lying exposes the liar to false accusation among men; the mildest offence in slander leads to a rupture of friendship 1 A p a 1 1 i, explained (after an exegetic fashion) as a 1 1 a ij p 1 1 a n a ij p a j j a t i t i, ‘ is come to infliction of punishments.’ 2 Of. Compendium, pp. 47, 52. 3 Asevana. See p. 294, n. 2. 620. 368 Eternal Things and Duration among men ; the lightest result of harsh words creates sounds jarring on the human car ; the slightest result of idle talk is speech commanding no respect 1 among men ; the mildest inebriety conduces to leant of sanity among men ’P 4 And again : 4 Wrong views, bhikkhus, wrong aspiration, effort, speech, activity, livelihood mindfulness, concentration — each ami all, if habitually practised, developed, and multiplied, conduce to rebirth in purgatory , among animals, among Petas ’ ? And again: ‘Bight views, right purpose, etc, habitually practised, developed, and multiplied, have their base and their goal and their cud in the Ambrosial ’P 8. Of Momentary Duration . Controverted Point. — That all things are momentary conscious units. From the Commentary. — Some — for instance, the Pubbaseliyas and the Aparaseliyas — hold that, since all conditioned things are imper- manent, therefore they endure but one conscious moment. Given, universal impermanence — one thing ceases quickly, another after an interval — what, they ask, is here the law ? The Theravadin shows it is but arbitrary to say that because things are not immutable, therefore they all last but one mental moment. 1 Th. — Do you imply that a mountain, the ocean, Sineru chief of mountains, the cohesive, fiery, and mobile elements, grass, twigs, trees, all last so long in con- sciousness ? You deny. . . . 2 Or do you imply that the organ of sight coincides 4 for the same moment of time with the visual cognition ? If you assent, I would remind you of what the venerable Sariputta said : 4 If, brother, the eye within be intact, but the object ‘without does not come into focus, and there is no so* ordinated application of mind resulting therefrom, then a cor - responding state of cognition is not manifested. And if the 1 Cf. the positive form of this term in Vinaya Texts, iii. 186, § 8. 2 Anguttara-Nik., iv. 247. 3 Sa?jyutta-Nih, v. 54, but the word a s e v i t o is wanting. 4 S a h a j a t a 3, ‘ come into being and cease together.’ — Corny. 864 Eternal Things and Duration XXII. 8. organ of sight within be intact, and the object without come into focus, but no co-ordinated application of mind result therefrom, a corresponding state of cognition is not manifested. But if all these conditions be satisfied, then a corresponding state of cognition is manifested ’ l 1 Where now is your assertion about coincidence in time ? 8 The same Suttanta reference may be cited to refute you with respect to time-coincidence in the other four senses. 4 P, A . — But are ail things permanent, enduring, per- during, immutable ? Th . — Nay that cannot truly be said. . . . 1 Majjhima-Nik., i. 190.